MDE Unlocker V3 20 Full [PATCHED] 11
MDE Unlocker V3 20 Full 11
the most serious difference in the java runtime environment is that all of the elements of the java software system are executed as untrusted code. to limit the damage of such an attack, java employs a security manager. a correct implementation of a security manager must take into account the granularity of the additional protection, and cannot be based on binary decision trees. hence, it must be based on a decision tree where the executive part is as clear as possible.
a reliable authentication mechanism is required for java due to the possibility of a successful man-in-the-middle attack. the security manager must be able to identify the operating system with a high degree of reliability, to perform appropriate actions when there are external threats, and to protect the data of the operating system user from various attacks.
however, it is not possible to completely separate the security features of the java runtime environment from the security features of the underlying operating system. a very basic model of security is not enough to protect the interests of both, and there is a risk that an attacker could compromise the security of the operating system. the security manager must be able to limit the access to resources the java runtime environment is allowed to use. this requires authentication and authorization of the programs and the operating system user.
to remain useful, the security manager must take into account the way other security measures are applied by the operating system. java runtime environments are often required to be exempt from the anti-tamper protections that have been added to certain parts of the operating system. this means the security manager must be able to determine if and when other security measures are activated and take the appropriate action, e.g. provide access to the resources the security manager is allowed to use.
the memorystore interface and the corresponding memorystore.loadfromstream and memorystore.loadfromresource methods are deprecated and will be removed in a future major version. instead, the memorystore.load api should be used. this also has the advantage that the api automatically works with serialization, as it is not restricted to loading from a stream; instead, it can load objects from files or resources.
to minimize the amount of memory needed when deserializing objects, fields that can be determined by the method must be loaded directly, not through references. in order to determine if a field is loaded directly, the isdirectfieldloading() method is added. a direct loaded field is loaded during the field access initializations, and is loaded with the least privileged set of permissions. a field that is not loaded directly requires an additional getobjectinputstream() call that can fetch the serialized representation.
the jni has a security related antipattern: c code that imports native libraries is given a new class loader for each invocation of the loadlibrary function, instead of one class loader for the entire vm. the new class loader is additionally checked before loading any native library.
many of the convenient surface programming features that java provides are deprecated in a programming model that is higher in abstraction level. developers must not take for granted that access to a class is equivalent to having access to the whole package of the class, or that a scope annotation is equivalent to granting an unprivileged access to a class. abstracting over access rights is not possible: for instance, a library cannot grant privileges to other code at run-time. to implement more secure code you need to be aware of the privileges granted to the client code and check access rights in a way that only grants to the code what it actually needs.